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Abstract Online advertising is currently a rich source of revenue for many Internet
giants. With the ever-increasing number of smart phones, there is a fertile market
for personalised and localised advertising. A key benefit of using mobile phones is
to take advantage of the significant amount of information on phones — such as
locations of interest to the user — in order to provide personalised advertisements.
Preservation of user privacy, however, is essential for successful deployment of such
a system. In this chapter we provide an overview of existing advertising systems
and privacy concerns on mobile phones, in addition to a system, MobiAd, which in-
cludes protocols for scalable local advertisement download and privacy-aware click
report dissemination. In the final section of this chapter we describe some of the
security mechanisms used in detecting click-through fraud, and techniques that can
be used to ensure that the extra privacy protections of MobiAd are not abused to
defraud advertisers.
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1 Introduction
Advertising is one of the largest revenue sources of many Internet giants. Targeted
and personalised advertisements, provided by advertising brokers such as Google
and Microsoft, are displayed on designated advertisement slots on websites that in
return receive payment from the advertising network. Google’s advertising revenue
in 2010 was over $28 billion and is only expected to increase over time.1
The mobile phone advertising market is also becoming increasingly significant.
There are currently over 3 billion mobile phone subscribers in the world. Sur-
veys from Gartner and Telsyte group suggest that nearly a third of these are using
smart phones, with the smart phone market increasing at a rate of nearly 50% last
year (Cozza et al, 2008). With modern smart phones having 3G and wireless con-
nectivity, GPS and Wi-Fi localisation capabilities, a wide range of social network-
ing applications and web-browsing abilities on large touch LCD displays, there is
a fertile market for targeted and personalised advertising. Naturally, handset man-
ufacturers have recently launched a series of advertising platforms which leverage
the users’ choice of websites, activities, music and social activities to present them
with targeted advertisements.
There are a large number of technical, legal and user-related obstacles to over-
come on the path to a successful mobile advertising strategy. The use of sensitive,
personal information kept on the phones can raise privacy concerns, and successful
and accurate profiling and personalisation of advertisements will depend strongly
on advertising networks assuaging consumers’ privacy concerns over targeted ad-
vertisements (Turow and Hennessy, 2007). Mobile phones in general have also less
bandwidth, processing power and screen size when compared to ordinary comput-
ers. Hence any advertisements must be smaller, downloaded less frequently and have
low processing requirements. The profiling tasks must also require limited compu-
tation and storage access to preserve battery life.
This chapter describes MobiAd, a system for personalised, localised and targeted
advertising on smart phones. Utilising the rich set of information available on the
phone, MobiAd presents the user with local advertisements in a privacy-preserving
manner. Advertisements are selected by the phone from the pool of advertisements
which are broadcast on the local mobile base station or received from local Wi-Fi
hotspots. In this manner, the user only needs to download advertisements which
are relevant to his interests, and are for items and services in his locality. Infor-
mation about advertisement views and clicks are then encrypted and sent to the
advertisement channel via other mobile phones and intermittent Wi-Fi hotspots, in a
delay-tolerant manner. In this system, other nodes and the network operator cannot
discover which advertisements were viewed. Likewise, the advertisement provider
cannot determine which users viewed which advertisements and only receives ag-
gregate information. MobiAd allows businesses, both local and global, to target
users narrowly and directly, without compromising users’ privacy. It also improves
1 http://investor.google.com/fin_data.html
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the scalability of advertisement distribution by using a local broadcast frequency
with geo-targeted advertisements.
In this chapter we also discuss the security issues surrounding online advertising,
such as click fraud, where a weblog publisher continuously clicks on the advertise-
ments displayed on his own website in order to make revenue. Detecting click fraud
is a relatively new area of research. In its simplest form, the broker can perform
threshold-based detection. If a web page is receiving a high number of clicks from
the same IP address in a short interval, these clicks can be flagged as fraud. The
detection gets complicated if the clickers are behind proxies or globally distributed.
We present Bluff Ads (Haddadi, 2010), a set of advertisements which are designed
to be detected and clicked only by machines, or poorly trained click-fraud work
force. These advertisements are targeted at the same audience profile as the other
advertisement groups, however their displayed text is totally unrelated to the user
profile. Hence they should not be clicked on by the benign user. This simple set
of advertisements, mixed with ordinary advertisements, work as a litmus test, or a
“CAPTCHA” for the user’s legitimacy. If a high number of Bluff ads are clicked, the
user is deemed to be flagged as suspicious. Another form of Bluff ads is a set which
contain specialised text but they are not targeted to a specific profile and are ran-
domly displayed. This group helps in detecting click-fraud when the botnet builds
up a fake profile to harvest relevant ads.
2 Advertising and Privacy
Despite the fertile market for advertising, there are not many dedicated advertising
networks for mobile phones. There are a few services for serving advertisements on
mobile websites. For instance, AdMob is a service which provides advertisements
for more than 15,000 mobile Web sites and applications around the world. AdMob
stores and analyses the data from every advertisement request, impression, and click
and uses this to optimise advertisement-matching in its network (AdMob, 2010).
However the methods used are in no way privacy-aware or localised. This limits
the scalability of the system as advertisements have to be served individually at the
time of browsing. This is not an issue in general for desktops, but on a mobile phone
numerous HTTP connections could slow down the browsing experience.
Adnostic (Toubiana et al, 2010) and Privad (Guha et al, 2009) are also newly-
proposed private advertising systems for ordinary browsers. They work on the ba-
sis of downloading all of the relevant advertisements offline and showing them at
appropriate times. The core ideas of these systems are similar to MobiAd from a
privacy perspective. Operation in a mobile environment, however, brings a range
of challenges on dissemination of advertisements, capturing reports and scalability.
We have attempted to address these issues by using a range of solutions such as
DTN for report collection and 3G broadcast channel for advertisement dissemina-
tion. MobiAd is also resistant to collusion between advertisers and network opera-
4 Hamed Haddadi, Pan Hui, Tristan Henderson and Ian Brown
tors, as the DTN anonymisation strategy would prevent the origin of the clicks being
easily traced.
Recently, Apple and Microsoft have also entered the mobile advertising market.
Apple launched the iAd service2, on which they will perform a range of standard tar-
geting options including demographics, application preferences, music and movies
choice and location. All of this information will be kept by Apple and will be used to
target advertisements to relevant customers. Google use advertisements throughout
their Android smartphone operating system, while Microsoft also envisage a similar
service on the Windows Mobile platform. Having such detailed profile information
at a content provider or handset provider’s disposal is a clear threat to users’ pri-
vacy. There are some suggested solutions for managing cookies and trackers, but
they usually require detailed analysis of the cost-benefit trade-offs Freudiger et al
(2009).
The concept of mobile or pervasive advertising has been researched for several
years, e.g., (Ranganathan and Campbell, 2002). Mobile advertising systems have
been built and studied using existing technologies such as Bluetooth (Aalto et al,
2004) to test their viability. User studies have also been carried out on simple mo-
bile advertising scenarios, such as the sale of ringtones (Merisavo et al, 2006), that
indicate that users who are exposed to such advertising do indeed purchase the ad-
vertised services. M-system has also been introduced by Komulainen et al (2006)
as a permission based advertising for the use of local retailers and consumers. In
this system, service provider hosted the system and gathered and updated databases
of consumers. The m- advertisers or their advertising agencies created and sent the
m-ads by using the advertising tool. However the profile information was provided
by consumer and kept up-to-date in the central database. They found that almost all
users find privacy a concern in this system which could potentially be compensated
by monetary or entertainment value. However, retailers naturally had great interest
in use of the system.
But despite this interest in the area, we still lack high-quality data about how,
where, and when consumers are willing to allow mobile advertising, or indeed if
they would be willing to allow their smartphones or other mobile devices to be
used to transport such advertising content. One factor in this dearth of useful data is
the general difficulty in capturing data from smartphone users. New measurement
studies have recently been conducted (Do and Perez, 2010; Falaki et al, 2010; Shye
et al, 2009) and testbeds built (Shepard et al, 2010), but these tend to concentrate
on network-level data such as traffic statistics, rather than user-level data such as
willingness to participate in content sharing.
A second factor is that collecting data from advertising networks is fraught with
difficulties itself. Guha et al.(Guha et al, 2010) outline the challenges in measure-
ment, including differences between measurement clients, due to noise from DNS
load-balancing, and the churn of advertisements. These difficulties become even
more challenging in a mobile environment: a user study that proposed to measure
and collect data from mobile users in a mobile advertising environment would no
2 http://advertising.apple.com/
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doubt have even more variations in advertising, given differences between users in
locations, activities, behaviours and networks.
One solution might be to combine passive measurement with an active user study,
allowing experimental participants to verify the types of advertisements being re-
ceived, and the contexts, behaviours and experiences under which they are willing
and unwilling to view, click on, or distribute such advertisements. One mechanism
for doing this might be to use the Experience Sampling Method, where participants
combine a diary study with signal-contingent alerts which trigger questions (Larson
and Csikszentmihalyi, 1983). For instance, a participant could be detected near a
shopping centre or restaurant, and this might trigger questions about their advertis-
ing preferences. Experience Sampling has been combined successfully with mobile
devices, e.g., (Mancini et al, 2009; Consolvo and Walker, 2003; Ben Abdesslem
et al, 2010), but care should be taken before implementing a large-scale mobile
advertising ESM study. For instance, the ethical, legal and privacy implications of
collecting mobile location and advertising data need to be considered (Henderson
and Ben Abdesslem, 2009), and mechanisms for anonymising data accordingly need
to be designed, especially given the number of related datasets that have been sub-
sequently deanonymised by researchers (Ohm, 2009).
There are a number of solutions for avoiding click fraud and performing better
advertisement. One suggestion is to charge based on user’s actions, i.e., the publisher
gets a premium only after the successful conversion of the advertisement, meaning
the user’s visit to the advertiser’s website and performing an action such as buying
an item or signing up for a service. There are a number of basic attempts at such an
approach by means of tracking cookies, however these efforts make up a negligible
portion of the current advertising revenue on the Internet.
Juels et al. (Juels et al, 2007) propose a cryptographic approach for replacing the
pay-per-click model with one in which pay-per-action (e.g., shopping) can attract
premium rates and unsuccessful clicks are discarded. in this system, the users which
make a purchase are identified by the network of advertisers as premium advertis-
ers. The client browsers use a coupon instantiated by third party cookies or issued
by the attestor upon redirection. The disadvantage of this method is the ability of
malicious attacker, possibly an advertiser, to use a botnet and replay the coupons
numerous times, for a large number of cooperating publishers. This will then force
the syndicator either discount all those replays, or removing those clients from the
system with valid coupons. In both cases, the advertisement income is minimised. It
also allows for the syndicator and the attestor (ad broker and middle box) to profile
the users accurately including their spending budget. They also indicate that most
standard click fraud techniques remain unsolved today. Despite early suggestions of
this method, it has not been implemented on a large scale as it requires trust between
advertisers and publishers.
Some advertisers have suggested the use of anonymised ISP data streams for
verification of clicks and for better user profiling. Attempts to do so, such as Phorm,
have been unsuccessful due to user privacy concerns. Privacy reasons also prevent
brokers from releasing their server logs and click data to advertisers and their agents
for deep inspection of the click rates. Other solutions include use of human-invisible
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advertisements to act as traps for botnets, but these can easily be ignored by a simple
visibility test in botnet design.
Immorlica et al.analyse the click-fraud learning algorithms to compute the esti-
mated click-through rate (Immorlica et al, 2005). They focus on a situation in which
there is just one advertisement slot, and show that fraudulent clicks can not increase
the expected payment per impression by more than o(1) in a click-based algorithm.
The complexity of the inferred algorithm and the need for click-through rate estima-
tion, however, would make it impractical as it also deviates from the pay-per-click
model, to pay-per-view model, which is the least desired model in the modern ad-
vertisement world where bidding for space is of critical importance.
3 Internet Targeted Advertising Basics
Fig. 1 Targeted keyword-based advertising.
Before introducing our MobiAd system, we first characterise today’s advertis-
ing systems. These can be broken down into four major components: advertisers,
publishers, clients, and brokers.
Advertisers wish to sell their products or services through advertisements. Pub-
lishers (e.g., news and review websites, personal weblogs) provide opportunities
to view advertisements, for instance by providing space for advertising banners.
Clients are the devices that show publisher web pages and advertisements to users.
Brokers (e.g., Google or Yahoo!) bring together advertisers, publishers, and clients.
They provide advertisements to users, gather statistics about which advertisements
were shown on which publisher’s pages, collect money from the advertisers, and
pay the publishers.
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Figure 1 illustrates the most popular advertising model on the Internet today. Ad-
vertisers specify their advertisements and bids (how much the advertiser is willing
to pay for views and clicks of the ads) to the broker. When a publisher provides
banner space to the client on a web page, a request goes to the broker, asking it
to fill in the banner space with appropriate advertisements. The provider makes the
decision as to which advertisements to place based on a number of criteria such as
the keywords for the web page, personalisation information about the client (usu-
ally persistent cookies on client machine), the keywords of the advertisement, and
the bid associated with the advertisement. It then delivers the advertisement to the
client, informs the advertiser of the advertisement’s views and clicks, and charges
the advertisers and compensates the publishers accordingly.
4 MobiAd architecture
Fig. 2 Targeted localised advertising.
In this section we present an overview of the MobiAd system architecture. Fig-
ure 2 presents an example of some of the components of the MobiAd advertising
system. The main components of the system are:
• Advertisers: The advertising providers aim to reach a specific groups of users
based on requirements such as sex, age, interests and location. They provide
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the advertisement texts, targeting information, bidding budgets and potentially a
landing page for the clicks3.
• Network Operator: The network operator provides the infrastructure for dissem-
inating the advertisements, collecting reports and locating users. In return they
receive a share of revenues.
• Content Provider: Content providers, such as news sites and blogs, provide on-
line services and materials which are of interest to users. Alongside their main
content, they provide advertising boxes where personalised advertisements can
be displayed to the user. Social networking sites such as Facebook are a partic-
ular type of publisher, with access to detailed profile information on their users
that can be used for targeting.
• Ad Provider: The ad providers (e.g., Google or Microsoft) are the interface be-
tween the advertisers, operator and content providers. They gather advertise-
ments from advertisers, provide advertisements for the users in the publisher
websites, collect view and click reports, bill the advertisers and compensate the
publishers and the network operator.
• Profiling Agent: The agent gathers relevant information for profiling users. It
also downloads and filters relevant advertisements, displays them to the user at
appropriate and convenient times and prepares click and view reports for billing
purposes.
By using detailed profiling and data-mining techniques in addition to sensed
mobile information such as users’ locations, MobiAd provides new opportunities
for localised and personalised advertising. In terms of privacy protections, some
of these components are also similar to traditional advertising systems (such as
Google’s AdWords program) or newly proposed privacy-aware systems such as Ad-
nostic (Toubiana et al, 2010) and Privad (Guha et al, 2009). The key difference in
our system, however, here is the fact that mobility and use of local advertisement
distribution and Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN) (Fall, 2003) provide a simple and
scalable advertisement distribution and privacy-preserving click-report mechanism,
while addressing many of the numerous challenges for profiling and advertisement
placement on a mobile device with limited screen size and battery life. The network
operator also plays a more central role as it needs to broadcast advertisements in
a localised manner and collect and forward reports. The lower bandwidth, battery
life and display size of mobile phones prevent us from downloading, sorting and
showing a large number of advertisements on the user’s phone. Hence in MobiAd
we focus on displaying a lower number of advertisements, but with higher targeting
and a focus on local advertisements that would particularly benefit from the user’s
location information.
In the next sections we expand on the key individual components, their roles and
operation strategies.
3 We elaborate in Section 7 why a landing page is not essential
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5 Profiling and Incentives
The most important objective of MobiAd is to serve relevant and interesting ad-
vertisements to the user. Since the mobile phone’s battery life and display size and
general browsing time are currently reduced compared to the average personal com-
puter, it is crucial to use the advertisement display opportunities effectively. In order
to do this, users’ interests and profiles should be maintained on user handsets, while
allowing the user to configure and delete their interest categories. This is also in
compliance with requirements and recommendations of most regulatory organisa-
tions and privacy advocates.
5.1 Maintaining the User Profile
There are many rich sources of profile information on a typical smartphone, from
email and browsing activities to social networking and shopping sites. This infor-
mation is in essence an aggregation of information from the user’s web history,
application caches and keyword extractions from activities on social networks and
email. Users are likely to have different privacy sensitivities regarding these various
data sources, and should be allowed to control which are included in profiling ac-
tivities. Browsing behaviour can be used to update profiles at lower processing cost
using server-side pre-categorisation of URIs into interest segments (Toubiana et al,
2010).
The profile and the associated software work in cooperation in a similar man-
ner to Google’s Gmail or persistent cookies from search engines and advertising
providers. In MobiAd, however, the profile does not leave the user’s handset and
the software platform picks up the appropriate advertisements from the broadcast
channel.
As a further protection the profile is an aggregate view of user interests rather
than a detailed history, reducing the risk of information leakage. Such aggregated
information can exclude information about sensitive matters such as medical in-
terests, trade union membership and religious beliefs. This builds user trust in the
system, reduces the potential for this information to be accessed for unauthorised
purposes, and enables easier compliance with data protection laws such as the Eu-
ropean Union’s Data Protection Directive (European Parliament, 1995).
In this design, user profiles are kept solely and securely on the handset. The pro-
file must be visible to the user but unobtainable by other applications. The isolation
of information between different applications is readily available on popular smart
phones. Profiling tasks can be done while the phone is idle. The extent and depth
of categorisation is dependant on the different regions and users, e.g., Google keeps
700 categories in a 3-level hierarchy, while Amazon has over 65,000 categories. We
envisage that a MobiAd client can maintain an extensive database of interests, lo-
cations, mobility patterns and daily habits. Such detailed information would enable
the relevant advertisements to be easily filtered and directed to the user.
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5.2 User Incentives
The MobiAd system is clearly beneficial to advertisers and network operators, but
why would users install such an application? Users have an incentive to install and
utilise most applications if there is a marginal entertainment or financial benefit for
them. iPod touch users download an average of 12 apps a month and spend 100
minutes a day using apps.4 Android and iPhone users download a similar number
of apps every month and spend a similar amount of time using the apps (AdMob,
2010). On a new iPhone app, users have been reported to be searching daily for
money saving vouchers and local promotions.5 Hence the intention is that useful
services would encourage the users to download the client which could also act as a
privacy information centre on their phone.
For the MobiAd system, we are exploring a range of advertisement benefits to
the user, location-based and independent. Location-based benefits could include of-
fers and coupons for local businesses and retailers. Independent long-term bene-
fits could include informative applications, such as suggesting events and activities
which could be off interest to the user and are not necessarily advertised. In addition,
network operators may pre-install this type of software on handsets, or offer incen-
tives to users (such as discounted monthly fees) for them to use MobiAd. In this way
the costs of carrying other user reports can also be compensated by the availability
of a user’s handset for carrying traffic and hence contributing to the anonymisation
process. Another incentive could be a small percentage cut payment from the ad-
vertising click revenue for the report carriers, in an aggregate manner, so as to avoid
the network operator or the advertiser being able to trace the origin of the clicks.
6 Dissemination and Reporting
6.1 Advertisement Dissemination
Dissemination of advertisements in a mobile environment is different from the desk-
top environment. In MobiAd, the focus is on local advertisements that are relevant
to the user. Location information can be obtained using GPS, Wi-Fi or network
provider information from the handset. While users may roam in and out of mobile
cells and thus affect advertisement download rates, it has also been shown that there
are limits to predictability of location of users at given times (Song et al, 2010). We
therefore do not rely heavily on prefetching all the relevant advertisements to the
user, apart from at locations such as home and work where they appear frequently.
The optimal data dissemination strategy should avoid constant data download,
but be ready for unpredictable arrival of the user into new areas. The MobiAd agent
4 http://www.appleinsider.com/articles/10/02/25/ipod_touch_users_
spend_more_time_using_apps_than_those_with_iphones.html
5 http://www.pocket-lint.com/news/34077/deals-moneysupermarket-launches-iphone-app
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on-handset should be able to classify locations that are frequently visited (using
a list of GPS positions most frequently visited), such as the route from home to
work, weekend hotspots and such like. The advertisements for these locations could
be prefetched when there is wireless connectivity and stored for longer periods, to
minimise data transfer costs and battery utilisation on the handset.
When a user enters a new location where the relevant advertisements have not
already been prefetched, she can receive all local advertisements using technologies
such as Multimedia Broadcast and Multicast Services (MBMS) (MBMS, 2010).
MBMS is a new service offered on GSM and UMTS networks and uses multicast
distribution in the core network that enables an interaction between the handset and
the network which can be used for distributing advertisements and collection of
reports. MBMS enables network operators to distribute all the local advertisement
texts simultaneously to all cell phone users within each transmitter’s coverage area
using a single shared transmission broadcast. As cell coverage is expected to be in
order of a few hundred metres, the text advertisements within each cell should not
exceed a few kilobytes (a few hundred local advertisements, each having around
100 characters of text) which is a reasonable amount of data transfer for all modern
smart phones to deal with. If one channel is used at each cell tower to broadcast
locally-relevant ads, all phones could listen to all channels and just select relevant
advertisements without revealing which advertisements are of interest and shown to
the user. If more privacy is required, protocols such as SlyFi (Greenstein et al, 2008)
could be used to provide anonymous sniffing capabilities for downloading advertise-
ments from local Wi-Fi hotspots. However since all the local advertisements can be
downloaded from Wi-Fi hotspots, the hotspot service provider is not able to classify
the users, as they cannot find out which advertisements were displayed. The num-
ber of broadcast advertisements even in busy metropolitan areas could be limited
by a combination of network operator and ad provider using an auction mechanism
to limit the number of location-targeted advertisements through raising their price.
Hence we opted for local flooding for the current design.
It is also possible for the advertising network to suggest a shortlist of rele-
vant advertisements within specific advertisement frames, resulting from centrally-
available context and pricing information (Toubiana et al, 2010). One may also con-
sider using Tor6 for ad dissemination or report collection, however Tor requires
a real-time interactive channel that consumes significant amounts of power. Mo-
biAd’s transmission of advertisement reports does not need a real-time interactive
anonymous channel. By relaxing this requirement, we can reduce power use.
6 http://www.torproject.org/
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6.2 Billing
At the end of each billing cycle, advertisers are billed by the advertising network
for advert displays and click-throughs. MobiAd uses a cryptographic protocol de-
veloped by Toubiana et al. that allows clients to notify the network of advertisement
impressions without leaking user interest information (Toubiana et al, 2010).
Fig. 3 Encrypting click reports.
Figure 3 provides an overview of the public key encryption stages of the click
reports. The advertisement report will be encrypted using the advertising provider’s
public key, so only the advertising provider can open the report. Advertisement
clicks will then be anonymised, as the advertising provider can identify the adver-
tisement which was clicked, but does not know who clicked on the advertisement.
Likewise, the network operator knows a report was received, but does not know
what advertisement was clicked on. MobiAd also uses a one-time pseudorandom
number in order to avoid replay clicks. This is similar to the reporting mechanism
used in Privad (Guha et al, 2009). We avoid using more sophisticated methods such
as Tor due to the complexity of running such CPU- and data-intensive systems on
mobile phones.
6.3 Report Collection Using DTN
As advertisers are generally billed using information on cost-per-impression or cost-
per-click, there needs to be a return path for clients to report these data (without
leaking information on user interests). To further protect users against attempts to
link reports to user behaviour, we take a similar approach to onion routing (Dingle-
dine et al, 2004) using the DTN paradigm.
DTN was originally designed for interplanetary communication, where the de-
lays can be several minutes or longer (Burleigh et al, 2003), and then was adapted
to solve intermittent connectivity problems in daily life. Furthermore, it has been
recently shown that by leveraging the delay of transmission, DTN can improve the
anonymity of wireless communication from physical localisation (e.g., triangula-
tion) (Lu et al, 2010). Onion routing is an approach to achieve anonymous commu-
nication by routing messages through several intermediate relays before reaching
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their destinations, and so the probability of revealing the source node of a mes-
sage is significantly reduced. As shown in Figure 4, the MobiAd agent system is
designed to report on advertisement views and clicks, while preserving the privacy
and anonymity of users.
Fig. 4 Collecting reports via a Delay-Tolerant Network.
In MobiAd, we use DTN to route advertisement reports to several intermediate
relays before they are finally passed to the cellular network. DTN relies on mobile
peer-to-peer store-and-forward (using Wi-Fi or Bluetooth connections) and hence
there is no additional monetary cost on top of the cellular network cost. Here for
further privacy consideration we have three requirements: 1) the relays should have
certain social in-correlation with the social network, which prevents identity reverse
engineering from the social relationship, 2) if possible, the final location of the final
hop to the cellular network should have certain geographical distance from the orig-
inal location of the report, 3) we want a certain delay (but not too long for billing
purpose) between the time when the report is first sent out from the source and the
time when it is finally sent to the network.
To better guarantee successful delivery, we use two-copy forwarding instead of a
single copy (Spyropoulos et al, 2004) for the reports, which means that the source
will make a duplicate copy of the report and send them separately to two different re-
lays. The report will not be further duplicated during the multiple-hop transmission.
To achieve the social in-correlation criteria, we take an anti-social network approach
as opposite to the social-based approach introduced in BUBBLE Rap forwarding (Hui
et al, 2008), where a mobile device will periodically scan the environment and detect
the devices belonging to its social community. But here we obfuscate the sender’s
social network by adding random nodes, including friends and strangers, as relays
instead of socially-close nodes (Parris and Henderson, 2010). In this way the social
network of a node cannot be easily identified by an attacker who monitors all the
forwarded packets in a cell network where a node is frequently present.
In order to preserve the location and temporal privacy, we will set the number of
hops before the last hop to the cellular network to be 3 (so in total 4 hops). Based
14 Hamed Haddadi, Pan Hui, Tristan Henderson and Ian Brown
on the seminal work on 6-degree of separation by Milgram et al. (Milgram, 1967),
4 hops should be a reasonable distance in order to scramble the social correction,
and long enough for the message to have enough temporal delay and geographical
distance from the source. There may be energy consumption issues due to excessive
wireless scans for efficient DTN routing, but since delay is not a main concern for
the delivery of the advertisement reports, we do not need to scan the environment
so frequently.
While taking all these measures into consideration, it is theoretically possible for
an advertiser or the network operator, through long-term monitoring of the mobile
user, to determine which advertisement reports have a geographical correlation with
the user’s location. This is due to the user’s routes following a specific home-work-
home pattern for most of the days. In order to overcome this, MobiAd can employ a
system where base stations follow a similar approach to the DTN system proposed
before forwarding the reports for, for example reports from a specific region or
town could be forwarded all over the country, or they could be presented to the
advertising provider in aggregate form. In this way the advertising provider cannot
build an accurate estimate of number of phones and their geographic correlation in
specific regions. We are currently working towards categories of attack scenarios
by the advertisers, advertising provider, network operator and content provider and
plan to address these issues in future work.
7 Security and Privacy Challenges
MobiAd is privacy-aware, but several security and privacy challenges remain. An
open question is whether users that click on advertisements should be taken di-
rectly to an advertiser’s URI; redirected to an advertiser site via an intermediate
URI hosted by the ad provider for click-through measurement and fraud protection,
as commonly happens in today’s advertising networks; or to content also distributed
using an anonymous channel, to further limit the potential for linking users to spe-
cific interests. In general usage the click-through rate for adverts is extremely low,
so sending users directly to advertisers’ sites is much less privacy-intrusive than
building detailed server-side user profiles. Users may anyway voluntarily provide
further information to advertisers at this point, particularly if they make a purchase.
However, particularly privacy-sensitive users may make use of a service such as Tor
to reduce linkage of their browsing behaviour to any long-term identifier (such as an
IP address). Care needs to be taken to reduce the ability of malicious advertisers to
gain information on users who click-through an advert that is targeted at extremely
small numbers of individuals – both in terms of interests and in frequently-visited
locations such as homes and work places.
Careful attention also needs to be paid to client-side implementation details to
prevent information leakage. Advertisements need to be carefully isolated within
display pages using mechanisms such as identically-sized iframes, to prevent client-
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mediated communications between publisher and advertiser. This may preclude the
inclusion of active content such as Flash ads (Toubiana et al, 2010).
Mobile handsets are less frequently shared than PCs, and hence information is
less likely to leak between users of the same equipment. However, care must be
taken to protect profiles using a PIN or password from access by other people with
physical access to a handset. The possibility of coerced access – such as by par-
ents to their children’s handset profile – must also be considered, which is a further
reason for storing only aggregate information and excluding sensitive personal data
categories.
An issue outside the scope of MobiAd is users’ reactions to highly-targeted ad-
verts, even with guarantees that behavioural profiles remain entirely private to the
individuals they describe. Advertisers may need to tread carefully in targeting ad-
verts for products such as low-fat foods that to some users may raise concerns that
they have been unfairly categorised, or suggest lifestyle problems. A possible mech-
anism to address the first concern would be transparency in explaining to users why
they had been shown any given advert. Many countries also have laws that ban dis-
criminatory treatment of individuals based on certain characteristics that might be
inferred from behavioural profiles. For sensitive advertisements we envisage that no
reports need to be collected in order to minimise any privacy leaks. Even the land-
ing pages of such advertisements could be provided using a Content Distribution
Network (CDN), or they can be pre-fetched using the DTN system. We are dealing
with the privacy issues in more detail for future work.
8 Detecting Click Fraud
One of the main reasons that online advertising platforms keep detailed logs of user
clicks on adverts is to detect instances of fraud. In this section of this chapter we
describe some of the mechanisms used in such click-through fraud, and techniques
such as Bluff Ads that can be used to ensure the extra privacy protections of MobiAd
are not abused to defraud advertisers.
For fraud detection, one can add some untargeted ads, or as we refer to them,
Bluff ads to the advertisements displayed to the user. These are real advertisements,
but served randomly. Every time the user visits a publisher page, we serve the user
with probability p(i) with profiled advertisements, and with probability [1− p(i)]
with other, non related Bluff ads. The brokers’ entire advertising model is based on
the idea of showing only the most relevant advertising content. If displayed adver-
tisements are poisoned with context-free advertisements on a frequent basis, benign
users will perceive this as the broker doing a poor job at finding relevant adver-
tisements. Hence, the Bluff/real ratio must be set in a way that the user’s browsing
experience and advertising quality perception is not greatly affected. For example,
a user living in Iran should not ideally be presented with special offer advertise-
ments on beer during Oktoberfest. But it might not unreasonable to be shown car
adverts, though his profile has no indication of his interests in driving. In practice,
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the Bluff ads should be authentic advertisements of different advertisers, spread in
the network and shown randomly, but never charged for.
The Bluff ads serve two purposes. First, they give the user “comfort” that he
is not being watched too closely and monitored too deeply. Secondly and more
importantly, they help identify fraud clickers and eliminate them from the system.
These fraud agents are just clicking for publishers, or against a specific advertiser.
8.1 Using Bluff Ads
We now address different forms of click-fraud attacks and those on user privacy, and
we briefly describe how the Bluff ads will help minimise them.
8.1.1 Profiling the customer
The Bluff ads will prevent publishers and advertisers from narrowly targeting the
client as it is not possible to know whether the viewed advertisement was a Bluff or
not. Unless the publishers work in large groups together which will also increase the
difficulty level for them. The advertisers can naturally profile users easier, however
that is not avoidable as ultimately users; interests lead to revenue generation for
the advertiser and broker. If the broker notices that a specific web page covers many
categories it can ignore that website altogether. In the case of content aggregators the
broker can put specific emphasis on pages visited during client;s browsing session.
8.1.2 Publisher fraud
The most common case is where a publisher has hired a large botnet to perform
clicks for it. This can be easily realised from the frequency of the clicks. In this case
the publisher ID and the Bluff/real ratio for publishers can inform the broker of this
attack. If the Bluff/real ratio is higher than an average user, it is indicative of a bot
being in operation.
8.1.3 Attacks on advertisers
These can again be identified by the a combination of simple threshold sampling
and Bluff/real ratio of the advertisements. If most of the clicks from a host are
targeted towards a single advertiser, there will be an obvious trend in their Bluff/real
ratio. If the attacker decides to poison the statistics by clicking on random other
advertisements, the ratio will be affected again. Many large advertisers today use
specialised agencies to monitor their incoming traffic and identify spammers and
click-fraud users, who tend to visit often but spend no time on the advertiser website.
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These users are also identifiable if they come from same IPs with frequent visit
counts (simple threshold detection). The advertisers’ agents can hence pass a list of
fraud suspects to the broker who will remove them from the billing system.
8.1.4 Attacks on publisher
These are the most difficult attacks, when a publisher is under attack from another
source. Such attacks happen when reliable publishers, such as CNN, who use adver-
tising brokers, are under attack in order to damage their relationships with the ad-
vertisers and providers and ultimately eject them from the competition scene when
bidding for advertising space on the page. It is possible to detect such attacks by ex-
amining the Bluff/real ratio for the advertiser and publisher pair and identify these if
the frequency of views/clicks is less than a certain time threshold. Distributed attack
on publishers are a new form of attack and further research is needed to determine
solutions for detecting these in detail.
9 Summary
In this chapter we presented the MobiAd system architecture, a system for deliver-
ing personalised, localised and private yet scalable mobile advertisements. In this
system, advertisements are locally broadcast to users within mobile cells, appropri-
ate advertisements are shown to the user and view and click reports are collected
using a DTN system, preserving the privacy and anonymity of the user. MobiAd
provides an opportunity for using the significant amount of information on users’
smart phones for targeted advertising while protecting their privacy.
We also presented a brief overview of the current challenges in detection of click-
fraud in online advertising. We presented a simple detection strategy, Bluff ads.
These are sets of irrelevant advertisements displayed amongst user’s targeted ad-
vertisements, which should not be clicked on by an authentic user. Together with
threshold detection, IP address monitoring and profile matching techniques, Bluff
ads can be used to make it raise the bar for botnet owners to train their software, or
a human operator. The Bluff ads also may have a comfort factor of decreasing the
user’s negative perceptions by reducing the number of accurately targeted advertise-
ments. We are currently working on deployment of Bluff advertisements on a large
advertising service.
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